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Mechanisms for Fostering  
Multi-stakeholder Dialogues in  
Water Resource Management Projects
Water resource management takes place in complex, rapidly changing and uncertain realities. Users may not be 
aware of the impact that water decisions have 
on other users, and even where externalities are 
identified, they can be difficult to manage due 
to problems of information, communication. The 
increasing number of stakeholders all competing 
for access to limited water resources reduces the 
chances for achieving consensus on use. These 
difficulties are further aggravated when poverty 
incidence is factored in.
Poor coordination among stakeholders perpetuates 
inefficient water use, economic and environmental 
damage, negative externalities and social conflicts. 
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problems requires a high degree of coordination 
and cooperation. To develop solutions to overcome 
barriers and foster equitable and sustainable 
watershed resource management, there is a need 
to explicitly express the relationships between 
collective action, scale and poverty. Some 
mechanisms designed to achieve this are discussed 
below. 
Conversatorio de Accion 
Ciudadana 
The Conversatorio de Accion Ciudadana 
(CAC) is a politico-legal mechanism, that was 
implemented in three Colombian watersheds 
between 2005 and 2007. It is designed to 
address the inequalities in power and 
information between communities and 
government institutions, that often 
prohibit the former from exercising 
constitutional rights to participate 
and to hold the latter accountable. 
It is based on the idea of civil society 
and authorities conversing in familiar 
terms about issues of importance to both 
and arriving at agreements for action. In 
the end, it is expected that meaningful 
participation by civil society is achieved. The 
legal skills that private individuals learn can enable 
them to obtain information they had previously been 
denied and to compel authorities to respond within 
a fixed amount of time to specific concerns  they had 
previously ignored.
CAC led to 76 concrete commitments on the part 
of institutions to improve the watershed residents’ 
welfare and resource management. An assessment 
in late 2007 showed that compliance rates were 
relatively high, especially in communities which had 
stronger follow-up processes.
With the decentralization of local renewable 
resource management, there is a demand for 
innovative approaches, methods and tools that 
can improve the system’s adaptive capacity. After 
all, investments in social capital and collective 
action can have a major impact on helping people, 
especially the poor, break out of poverty traps. This 
document presents various mechanisms that can 
be employed to foster multi-stakeholder dialogues 
based on the experiences of and lessons identified 
from various water resource management projects 
under the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and 
Food (CPWF). 
Strengthening the 
engagement of the 
poor in community 
Processes1
There is a complex relationship between poverty 
and water. Achieving and maintaining collective 
action in watersheds to adequately address 
1 Source: http://www.capri.cgiar.org/pdf/Resources_Rights_Cooperation_H-10.pdf
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providing participants (players) with the same kinds 
of incentives that they would face in real-world 
decision-making situations. The experimental context 
allows researchers to vary the incentives—i.e., the 
rules of the game—and see the impacts of individual 
decisions’ outcomes as well as collective outcomes. 
Participants observe both types of outcomes, and 
how changes in rules can affect these. The impact 
that this can have on individuals and on the group 
as a whole, especially when community-level 
feedback sessions are held, can serve as powerful 
tools enabling people to understand collective action 
dilemmas and can thus be a starting point for change 
(Cardenas and Ostrom 2004). 
Economic experiments
Economic experiments, sometimes referred to as 
economic games, simulate real-world situations by 
Economic experiments
The economic experiments were conducted 
in Coello River and Fuquene Lake watersheds 
in Colombia, and Awach and Kapchorean 
rivers in Kenya. Three hundred and fifty-five 
and 284 participants joined the Irrigation 
Game and Water Trust Game, respectively. 
The sample (participants) distribution was 
gathered from across basins, games and 
treatments.  In Colombia, the economic 
games were conducted as part of the CACs. 
In Nyando, they were run independently due 
to problems with the implementation of the 
action research agenda in Kenya.
 
Collective action around water involves 
both the provision and the appropriation of 
the resource. Cooperation provision can be 
affected by the rival nature of appropriation 
and the asymmetries in access to the resource. 
To look at collective action around provision 
and appropriation, three experiments were 
used the Voluntary Contribution Game (VCM), 
the Irrigation Game, and the Trust Game. In 
all games, the participants received monetary 
incentives based on tokens earned during the 
game. 
CAC: Lessons learned
  The CAC methodology can have significant 
human and social capital impacts on 
community members who participate. It 
can also lead to changes in the ways that 
communities and institutions perceive 
each other, in some cases, moving from 
antagonism to respectful collaboration. 
 
  CAC takes time. The SCALES1 project was 
thought to take 3-6 months, but it took 
a year and a half to complete. More time 
should be allocated to properly prepare 
the communities and make institutional 
contacts. 
  A committed local institution with 
experience in community organization is 
the most critical determinant of success for 
CAC. 
  The early involvement of partner 
institutions can lead to more meaningful 
participation during the negotiation phase.  
  CAC impacts will be larger and will likely 
be more widely distributed if more 
community members are involved. A core 
team will always lead the process; however, 
more emphasis can be put on having them 
share progress and seek feedback from 
their communities.  
  Increasing the general public’s 
involvement with the CAC itself will make 
it clear to institutions that the people 
asking questions have the support of their 
communities.
1 SCALES (Sustaining inclusive Collection Action that Links Economic Scales in upper watershed) is a project (PN 20) under the CPWF
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distributed in equal shares to all players of the 
group at the end of each round. 
B.  Irrigation Game
 
The Irrigation Game is a new economic experiment 
that demonstrates the provision and appropriation 
aspects of the resource. It highlights the unequal 
access to and provision of water resource among 
players.
1.    In the first part of the game, the players are 
given 10 tokens. They will have to decide how 
many tokens they would want to contribute to 
a project to maintain water canals. The amount 
of available water for the group is increasing as 
the group contribution increases.
2.   Non-contributed tokens are kept in a private 
account, which yields private returns. These 
tokens are paid at the same monetary rate as 
the water units to be extracted in the second 
stage of each round.
A.  Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
 
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism draws from 
reciprocity and conditional cooperation theory 
introduced by Sugden and applied by Fehr and 
Gächter. They learned that positive reciprocity 
compels participants to contribute something to 
the public good if others are willing to contribute 
also. To sustain contribution to the public good, 
participants need to be reciprocally motivated. 
On the other hand, negative reciprocity can play a 
crucial role if participants think that others have a 
“free ride.” 
Voluntary Contribution Game
 
1.   At the beginning of each round, each player is 
given 25 tokens, which they could contribute to the 
public good or keep in a private account. 
2.    Participants are grouped into five people 
per group.  The total contributions to the 
public fund by the five players is doubled and 
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than their fair share (1/5, given that there are 
five players) are fined. In the high– penalty 
treatment, the fine is the water taken in excess 
of the of the fairshare plus six units from the 
earnings; in the low–penalty treatment, the fine 
is just the extra amount taken.
C.  Water Trust Game
 
The Water Trust Game is based on the standard 
trust game (Berg et al. 1995), but, in this sense, it 
is framed around water access and distribution 
between two persons located in different positions 
of a watershed.
 
1. At the beginning of the game, both players are 
given eight tokens.
2. Player 1 (proposer) can send a fraction of his/
her initial endowment to Player 2 (responder). 
The amount sent by Player 1 is tripled before 
it reaches Player 2, who then decides how to 
split the tripled amount plus his/her initial 
endowment between himself/herself and 
Player 1. This increase in the amount being sent 
reflects how a decision in favor of watershed 
conservation would increase the possibilities of 
greater social benifits to be distributed among 
the watershed members.
3. In the framing, however, the decision of 
Player 1 was explicitly framed: if upstream, 
as the quantity of clean water sent to Player 
2 downstream, and Player 2’s decision as 
an economic compensation for the water 
provided by Player 1. If the game starts with 
a downstream player, such a decision is also 
framed as economic compensation for the 
water provided by Player 1.
4. The Trust Game is implemented using the 
strategy method, that is, Player 2 is asked 
3.   The second decision of the players involves 
individual water extraction from the total water 
produced. This decision is made based on the 
location of the players along the water canal. 
Players positions are determined randomly for 
the entire sequence of rounds. Thier position 
is represented by a letter: A for the player in 
the first position and E for the player in the 
last position. The water is allocated, therefore, 
according to the location in the following 
manner. Player A first receives all the water 
produced by the group project and decides 
how much water to extract. The remaining 
water is then shown to Player B at who then 
decides how much to extract and how much 
to leave to the remaining players downstream, 
and so on for players C, D, and E. This sequence 
is conducted for 10 rounds.
4.    After the first 10 rounds of baseline treatment, 
the rules change for some groups and this 
change was announced to the players. Some 
groups are permitted to communicate, other 
groups faced external regulation treatments, 
and others continue to play under baseline 
conditions.
5. In the face-to-face communication treatment, 
players are allowed to communicate with the 
other players in the group before returning 
to their places to make their own private 
decisions. As in the baseline, they know the 
aggregate decision but not the individual 
decisions after each decision round.
6. In the external regulation, or penalty 
treatments, players are told that there would 
be a chance of being monitored each round.
The experimenter rolls a dice in front of the 
participants each round, and if it landed on all 
the participants would be inspected. 
The monitor checks the decisions of the players 
and the players who have taken more water 
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the complete strategy of responses to each 
possible offer by Player 1. Therefore, Player 
2 has to respond, without knowing yet the 
amount offered by Player 1, how many tokens 
he/she would return to Player 1 for each 
possible offer by Player 1 (0, 2, 4, 6, 8 units).
5. During the session, each of the players is asked 
the amount expected from the other player.
Conclusion
The use of economic 
games or experiments 
for the study of issues 
of development and the 
environment has increased 
substantially over the last few 
decades.  Behavioral sciences have 
made large contributions to the 
understanding of collective action 
and how rules and norms play 
a crucial role in solving the 
problem of managing common-
pool resources and solving 
the dilemma of group-based 
property rights.
In addition to helping to 
understand the foundations 
of behavior, these games can 
create space for an interactive 
dialogue with communities 
facing these dilemmas.  The 
games offer some potential for 
self-reflection in a dialogue 
among stakeholders, and 
even for social learning 
processes that create actual changes 
in behavior beyond the domain of the 
controlled game.
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